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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah
nf1~NNY

CRUZ,

Appellant,
vs.
DEPAHT::\fENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECPRI1'Y AND BOARD OF RE\' rgw OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMjf fSS! ON OF UTAH,

Case No.
11354

Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATrRE OF CASE
PPtition for rf'view challPnging the Department of
Emplo~·mpnt Sf'curit~' as affirmed by the Appeals Ref1·rpe and tlH· Board of Review of the Industrial Commi:-;c;ioll of Ptah holding appellant, Benny Cruz, to be
di~qnalifit•d from receiving unemployment benefits pur:;11ant to Sf'ction 35-4-5( d) UCA, 1953.
D fSPOSITION OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Board of Revif'w of the Industrial Commission,
af'tpr having revit>wed the rt>cord and testimony taken
hcfore the appeals refert>e, affirmed by a majority vote
(on<> disst>nt) the dPcision of the appeals referee which
rlPniPd A]lpellant unemployment compensation on the
gTounds that h0 was on strike at thP time of his appli,·ntion for hPnefit:-;.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of t!J 1,
Board of Review and an order granting him Unrmplo)·
ment Compensation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant commenced permanent employment
with Kennecott Copper Corporation on February 24,
1955 as a heavy equipment operator and continued in
that employment until .July 15, 1967, wlwn the Unifrrl
Steelworkers called a strike of tlw KPnnPcott operation~.
rrhe Appellant, as a mPmber of Operating EnginPPl'S
Local 3 honored the picket line. This action by the Appellant did not leave him ·without work. Ap1wllant had
bePn in fnll time employnwnt ( 40 to 48 honrs per \rPek)
with Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co. since April 20, 1967
Appellant's employment with Pioneer was as a hcmy
equipment operator and both permanent and continnou~:
lasting for more than five months aftPr the strike wac
callE"d at Kennecott.
On December 20, 19G7, Pionec>r laid the Appellant
off due to inclement WE'ather. It was at this point that
Appellant first considered himsc>lf unemployed and thm
entitled to unemplo~·nwnt comrwnsation. According\).
he filed a claim with tlw Department of Ernploywrnt
Recnrity, requesting unemployment benefits. The Dr ..
partnwnt tnnwd down Ap1wllant's n'qnest. .ffr app<'aleil
to thP. Hoard of HeYiuw of th(' lnclnstrial Commi~sion
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE
AND POLICY OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT.

This is a problem of first impression in this JUnsdidion. In such a sitnation it is not amiss to examine
tlw purpos(~s of the relPYant legislation in an attempt
lo find the correct application of the relevant statutes.
in this effort assistancE~ can be obtained from 33-4-2
CCA 1!353, wlwrein tlw legislature set forth the purpmws of tlw Employ111ent Secnrity Act. The policy that
tl:is Aet pnt into law is that of'' ... reducing the volume
of" lrn<·mp!oym(_'nt ... "and to provide benefits for periods
or llIH'1111Jloyuwnt to the end that purchasing power may
Iii· 11iaintained and that tlw "serions social consequences"
ol n11Pmployrnent ma.'· be limited. It is with this in mind
that tlw disqualification of 35-4-5 (1) must be construed.
Cl(·nrly this sC>ction mnst be interpreted carefully so that
il is C"(Ttain that no person or group of persons, where
it was not the intention of the legislature, be disqualified.
Tltis section is limited in its disqualification to only per~ons who an• ont of ·work " . . . due to a stoppage of
\1 ork "·heh exists hecamw of a strike ... " Appellant is
not out of work ht>canse of the' strike, he is out of work
ih·eansl' of a la .rnff bY
. Pioneer. It is most likely. that
\ jlpP! lant wonid neyer have applil·d for unemployment
I 111 r·:ts if his Yrnrk ·with PiOJl('('l" lrn(l not terminated
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through no fault of his own. (R. 0024) Surely the poli~,
of the Act is not to discourage people from working harrl
to care for their own. Also, it is doubtful that the legis
lature wished to deny assistance to a man who make,
the effort to contribute to "employment," "increased imrchasing power" and maintain his own "employnwnt."
POINT IL
APPELLANT IS NOT DISQUALIFIED BY 35-4-5
(d) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, BECAUSE HE WAS

NOT OUT OF EMPLOYMENT DUE TO A STRIKE.

One of the prerc>quisites of disqualification und('r
35-4-5 ( d) Utah Code Annotah·d is that the claimant lw
out of employment " . . . due to a stoppage of \\'ork
which exists because of a strike involving his ... group
of ·workers. . . "
The strike at Kl•nnecott was not the cause of Appellant's unemployment. Rather it was his layoff l1y
Pioneer that caused his nnemplo~anent. EvPn after tli 1
strike had started appellant was engaged in full tillw
permanent work and \rnnld hm-e continued ind0finitelY
had he not been laid off.
POINT IIL
APPELLANT'S

LAST

PLACE

OF

EMPLOY-

1\IENT WAS PIONEER SAND AND GRAVEL COl\lP ANY.
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Section 35-4-5 UCA 1953 ( d) is as follows:
"An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or
for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
( d) For any week ... that his unemployment is
due to a stoppage of work which exists because
of a strike involving his grade, . . . at the . . .
establishment at which he'iwas last employed."
(emphasis added)
Such statutes should be construed liberally to provide hPnefits to the claimant Scott v. Smith, supra.
With this principle of construction in mind it is
dPar that appellant was last employed by Pioneer. PiollPt>l' was the last place appellant worked and it was the
last place that paid him. 'J111at this is the proper result
is clear from the following cases: Bruly v. Industrial
Comm., 101 So. 2d 22 (Fla); Hopkins v. California Emvloyment Comm., 151 P.2d 229, 154 ALR 1084 and La/Ji11sky v. Florida Industrial Comm., 167 So. 2d 620 (Fla).
In the Bruly case the court construed a statute similar
tu our 35-4-5 ( d) UCA 1953 and held that a person who
haJ gone on strike and then taken subsequent employ111Pnt which lasted for nine months was last employed
11~ the subsequent employer. The following expression
from that case demonstrates the reasonable approach of
tltat e.ourt:
"N"ot on!Y is it contrary to the wording of the
statute, l;ut it is unr<>al.istic to say that the appel lant'i.; nnemploynwnt status for th<> weeks fol-
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lowing his discharge after nine months' emploi
ment ... constituted nnemployment due to a lab 1~ 1
dispute at a place wherP he was last employt>rl."
This is the proper constrnction of statntes snrl1 a'
35-4-5 ( d). To give it the construction placed upon it by
the Indnstrial Commission wonld be unduly harsl1 and
would disregard the rule that snch statutes should lw
constrned liberally.
POINT IV.
THE INDUSTRIAL BOARD'S CHARACTERIZATION OF APPELLANT'S EMPLOYMENT WITH
PIONEER AS "STOP GAP" IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.

The Board of ReviPw of the Industrial Conuni~~i1n1
found ap1wllant's em1iloy11wnt ·with Pi01wvr to Le "tlloJI
Gap": temporary employment. In so doing the Boan!
relied upon the Montana case of Scott 1J. Smith, 276 P.~d
72:1.
That case involvt>d employrPs, who \\'C'nt ont on
strike• against their rei:.,i1Jlar emplo.Yer and who obtaimd.
·during the five month labor dispnte, some other klllporary work. It shonld he ohsNvPd that their ··~4to1 1
Uap" employment was obtained suhsP<pwnt to tlH' lwgiu
ning of the strik<> and that it

1n1s

frmporary in natur 1'·

This is not tnw of U]lfll'llant Cn z. He obtained ern1:!il°'
1
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nli'nt with Pioneer Sand and Gravel Company approxirnatt>l:· three months before the Kennecott strike and
<'ontinuPd in that employment on a permanent basis for
fin~ months after the strike had started. In Scott v.
t..,'111ifh, supra, it is apparent that the Montana court's
rnling a1Jplies only to "temporary" employment, obtained
aftrr a strikt' or in anticipation of it, whereas, in the
l1l'('SP11t esae there is absolutely no evidence in the record
to indi<'atc~ that appellant's job with Pioneer Sand and
(irawl was anything other than permanent in its nature
nor that he acquired that work in anticipation of the
'trikP.
POINT V.
THERE IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
THAT

STRIKING EMPLOYEES ARE NOT EN-

TITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND
APPELLANT IS WITHIN THAT EXCEPTION.

TJw case of Scott 1;. Smith, supra, which the Board
ol' H<TiPw rPlied npon adopts the so-called "good faith"
''Xl'P}ltion. That Pxception is clearly presented in the
<'a:.:p of Bruley L Florida Industrial Commission, supra.
TliP "good faith" Pxception of this case is that employlll<'nt, with other than the strnck company, entered in
.:.;nod faith and rt>garded by the employee as permanent,
will l'l'lllOVl' the disqualification of statntPs similar to
l' :3:-J--1--f> (d) FCA 1953. It is clear that the Montana
rnnrt has acct'pted this position. In the ca::w of Scott v.
"'n1ith, snpra, that court madP th(• following statPrnent:
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"lt would readily be set>n that none of tlu•sp ca~,,,
d<>viatr from the principle we han lwretofoit·
outlined, in fact the Bergen casP and the Bnih
case are rlearl>- d<'ci<lPd within tlwse principJP, ;,
This statt'rnent \\·as made after that court had ~e1
forth tlw "good faith" rule of the BrnlY casP. 'rlwrifon·, it appears that if tlw Montana court was ro11
fronted with a situation, such as tht- irnstant onP, wlwrP
there is ample and nnrehutted evidence that the clairnant
had takt•n his Sl:'cond job for an indefinite time on a
permanent basis (R 0021) and in good faith (R. 002;lJ
it ·woukl acct>pt tlw "good faith" rule aml rPrnon tlw
disqualification.
THEREFORE, it is clear that the Board of Hevie\1
madP an error of law when it r<'lii·d upon tlH· ca~(' il
Scott v. Smith, supra. Ha<l it properly appli<'Cl that ea"'
to the instant situation, it would ha,-<> grantPd UJH'lll1

ployment hendits to thP appellant.

CONCLUSION
The policy of the J<~mploynwnt Security Ad is t11
reduce nnemployrnt>nt and to avoid tlw attPndant (•riJ,
of unemployment. l ts purpose is also to provide bP11dit.to those who art> out of t>mployrn<'nt through no fniii'
of thPir own. App<'llant's lack of ·work occlllT<'d hecan·'
of a layoH from fnll ti11H' pl·nnmwnt ('ltlplo>·11wnt. 'l'hi•r•
fon•, lw is Pntitled to tlw h('Jl<'fih of tliP ~\d.
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'l1he decision of the Board of Review denying unemployment benefits to appellant is not founded in the
evidence before them. It is also apparent that the authority relied upon from their decision if properly applied
wonld result in the opposite conclusion than the one
they reached.
Respectfully submitted,

MITSUNAGA & ROSS
By ..................................................... .
Galen Ross
Attorney for Appellant

